Relationship of IMF Programs with Income Distribution and Corruption in LDCs

An Empirical Analysis

53

Acknowledgment


# •Madam Shaista Alam(AERC)

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# •Review Committee

Providing opportunity and platform





### Introduction

- Finding the impact and relationship of IMF Programs with the improvement of social indicators is less discussed.
- The impact of policies on the income distribution and whether it has increased the inequality gap and poverty levels
- To link the increase of *corruption* in less developed countries (LDCs) with foreign funding along with to relate the **non economic social parameters**, is the objective of this paper.

Corruption

#### Review Literature

#### Impact on Inequality/Poverty

- Aggravated by
  - Layoffs, Subsidies, Higher/new taxes, & Privatization
  - Hyper-Devaluation and Hyper-Inflation worsen them
  - Trade Liberalization
    - Removal of protection
    - Demand for unskilled labor
    - Trade with high income countries
- Adversaries disappear in LR

#### Impact on Corruption

- Cyclic nature generates inequality that further enhances corruption causing poor to suffer
- Size of government and taxation are the foundation
- Highly related with
  - Dictatorship, Centralized government, Military Spending
- Reduction of Investment, FDI & Small business

### Review Literature (Cont'd)

#### Impact on Stabilization

- Empirical evidence of economic growth is ambiguous
- Fund Experts claim its success in short run at least
- Data confidentiality is major obstacle

#### Impact on Politics

- Approvals increased with alignment of policies toward influential countries
- Considerations can be political, historical or cultural factors rather economical
- Growth & Inflation forecasts are sometime biased too



- Limitations
  - Short and Long Run
  - Data Confidentiality
  - Systematical Differences
  - Hypothesis design is complex



### Determinants



#### Demand Side:

Reasons for a country to look towards IMF



#### Supply Side:

Variables for which IMF decision is based

## Objectives



## Theoretical Framework

IMF	Corruption	Inequality
Corruption	IMF	IMF
Inequality	Inequality	Corruption
poverty	Privatization	Poverty
Import/Export	Poverty	Hunger Index
Reserves/GDP	GDP Per Capita	GDP/Capita
Exports (raw material)	Industrialization Growth Rate	GDP Growth
Agriculture Income/GDP	Government Spending	Agriculture Income
Industrialization Growth Rate	Military Spending	Military Spending
Political Stability	Social Progress Index	Human Development Index
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index		

$$\begin{split} IMF_{it} &= \beta_{0it} + \beta_1 CPI_{it} + \beta_2 HDI_{it} + \beta_3 PHC_{it} + \beta_4 GHI_{it} + \beta_5 IMG_{it} + \beta_6 IMD_{it} + \beta_7 MLX_{it} \\ &+ \beta_8 EXD_{it} + \beta_9 EXR_{it} + \beta_{10} AGRI_{it} + \beta_{11} INDG_{it} + \beta_{12} HHI_{it} \end{split}$$

 $\begin{aligned} CPI_{it} &= \alpha_{0it} + \alpha_1 IGN_{it} + \alpha_2 GDPC_{it} + \alpha_3 PHC_{it} + \alpha_4 GHI_{it} + \alpha_5 IMD_{it} + \alpha_6 EXG + \alpha_7 EXD_{it} \\ &+ \alpha_8 AGRI_{it} + \alpha_9 INDG_{it} + \alpha_{10} FH_{it} \end{aligned}$ 

$$\begin{split} IGN_{it} &= \gamma_{0it} + \gamma_1 IMF_{it} + \gamma_2 HDI_{it} + \gamma_3 PHC_{it} + \gamma_4 IMD_{it} + \gamma_5 EXG + \gamma_6 EXD_{it} + \gamma_7 AGRI_{it} \\ &+ \gamma_8 INDG_{it} + \gamma_9 FH_{it} + \gamma_{10} MLX_{it} \end{split}$$



Simultaneous Equation Model

2SLS

## Methodology (cont'd)

- Endogenous Variables are
  - IMF = 1 if a country is in program of that year, 0 Otherwise
  - CPI = Corruption Perception Index
  - IGN = Gini Coefficient Index
- Exogenous/Instrument Variables are
  - HDI = Human Development Index
  - GHI = Global Hunger Index
  - PHC = Poverty Headcount Ratio @US\$1.99
  - GDPC = Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (Current, US\$)
  - GDPG = Gross Domestic Product Growth

## Methodology (cont'd)

• EXD	=	Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)
• EXG	=	Exports of goods and services (Growth)
• IMD	=	Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)
• IMG	=	Imports of goods and services (Growth)
• EXR	=	Agricultural raw materials exports (% of merchandise exports)
• MLX	=	Military expenditure (% of GDP)
• AGRI	=	Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)
• FH	=	Freedom House Index
• DP	=	1, if a country privatized its units in that year, O otherwise
• HHI	=	HH Market concentration index
• SPI	=	Social Progress Index
<ul> <li>INDG</li> </ul>	=	Industry, value added (annual % growth)

#### Data Sources

- Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) by Transparency International
- Country Finacial datasets by IMF
- Quality Growth Index by IMF
- IFS Database of IMF
- GINI index (World Bank estimate)
- Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) by UNDP
- Poverty & Equity Data of World Bank
- Privatization Database by World Bank
- WITS database of Worldbank
- SIPRI database for Military Expenditures
- Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) by World Bank

- Social Progress Index
- Human Development Index (HDI) by UNDP
- Global Hunger Index (GHI) by International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)
- Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) by World Bank
- Trade Outcomes Indicators by World Bank
- World Economic Outlook (WEO) by IMF
- World Development Indicators (WDI) data sets by The World Bank
- OXFAM Inequality reports
- Reports by Freedom House
- Quality Growth Index (QGI)
- Deininger, Klaus and Lyn Squire Database
- Barro-Lee data sets

Albania	Malawi	
Armenia	Mali	
Azerbaijan	Mauritania	
Bangladesh	Moldova	
Bangladesh	Mongolia	
Bolivia	Mozambique	
Burkina Faso	Nepal	
Cambodia	Nicaragua	
Cameroon	Pakistan	
Chad	Philippines	
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Rwanda	
Dominican Republic	Senegal	
Gambia, The	Sierra Leone	
Georgia	Sri Lanka	
Guinea	Tajikistan	
Guinea-Bissau	Tanzania	
Honduras	Тодо	
Kenya	Uganda	
Kyrgyz Republic	Vietnam	
Madagascar	Zambia	

Data Sets

40 out of 78 PRGF Countries

2004-2017

Dependant Variable: IMF(Causal Rela	ationship of IMF Progrm wit	h Inequality & Other determinants)
Endogenous VariableCorruption Perception Index(-1)Exogenous VariablesHuman Development IndexDifference (Import, Export)Imports (%GDP)GDP Per CapitaMilitary Expenditure (%GDP)Global Hunger Index*IMF(-1)Poverty Headcount Ratio*IMF(-1)Privatization*IMF(-1)	0.05 (2.27**) -6.48 (2.35**) 0.01 (2.10**) -0.02 (1.99**) -1E-4 (1.66*) -0.12 (1.52) 0.02 (1.81***) -0.01 (0.62) -0.12 (1.21)	<ul> <li>Unclear about demand/supply determinants</li> <li>Lagged, negative and significant (@5%) relationship with Corruption</li> <li>Lower HDL Level reduces to go into Fund Program or reduces for go into Fund Program or recent upon Imports higher than Exports</li> <li>Negative Military Exp Relation but unlikely to be key determinant</li> <li>GDP/Capita is not the criteria that IMF decides for, or isn't the factor that being low, will push a country to opt for funding.</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>Both Poverty Indicators impacts same</li> </ul>
Number of Observations	316	<ul> <li>Program doesn't induce privatization</li> </ul>
R <sup>2</sup>	0.28	
Joint Significance (Prob > F)	0.000	
*** (1% Significance Level) ** (5% Signif	icance Level) * (10% Signific	ance Level)

Dependant Variable: CPI (Causa	al Relationshi	p of Corruption wi	th I	nequality & Other determinants)
Endogenous Variable			٠	Unexpected results as inverse relationship among Corruption
Gini Coefficient*		1.02 (2.16**)		and Inequality
Exogenous Variables			•	The negative relationship of imports shows that, custom tariffs, procedures and import policies are not friendly, hence inducing corruption.
Imports (%GDP)		-0.05 (1.94**)		policies are not friendly, hence
GDP Per Capita		0.002 (1.75***)		inducing corruption.
Global Hunger Index		-0.57 (3.93*)		Though inverse but not quantifiable relationship with
Agriculture Income(% of GDP)		-0.21 (1.73***)		quantifiable relationship with
Privatization		0.35 (0.32)		GDP/Capita '
			•	Poverty along with agro- economies increase corruption <u>levels.</u>
Number of Observations R <sup>2</sup> Joint Significance (Prob > F)	327 0.48 0.000		•	No significant impact of privatization on corruption leve

Dependant Variable:GINI Coe	efficient (Causa	al Relationship of Ine	equality with IMF Programs)
Endogenous Variable			<ul> <li>IMF Programs are very much associated with Inequality</li> </ul>
IMF Exogenous Variables		4.95 (1.99**)	<ul> <li>IMF program in previous year, &amp; privatizing next year raises inequalit too</li> </ul>
Privatization*IMF(-1) IMF(-1)		2.79 (1.53****) -4.48 (1.61***)	<ul> <li>Surprisingly lagged impact of progra reduces the inequality by same magnitude</li> </ul>
Privatization(-3)*IMF(-3) Poverty Headcount Ratio		3.59 (1.80***) 0.36 (5.22*) -0.16 (2.63*)	<ul> <li>we can relate the result of previous that it's IMF conditionalities, which though increases the inequality in current year, but controls corruptio</li> </ul>
Poverty Headcount Ratio*IMF Freedom House		0.04 (0.86)	somehow • combinational lagged impact of 3 <sup>rd</sup> <u>year widens the inequality g</u> ap
Number of Observations R <sup>2</sup> Joint Significance (Prob > F)	340 0.86 0.000		<ul> <li>Higher PHC ratio corresponds highe inequality</li> </ul>
			<ul> <li><u>Reduced slightly if a country</u> is in IN Program</li> </ul>



- Inequality gap widens with IMF Programs
  - Despite that, corruption is reduced
  - poverty and growth, contrary to its major targets
- Privatization may not necessarily be reason of funding
- Privatization may not be cause of inequality, corruption

- No confidentiancy ...
   Measures to take for exportemmendations
   Measurement
- Military expenditure contra should be conditionality of program
- Revision of import policies to curb corruption
- Transformation of agri-economy towards industrialization
- Domestic influence during privatization must be minimized



